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ANONYMOUS JURIES
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York are
holding a series of highly publicized trials that represent a potentially
devastating setback for organized crime.' Encompassing the alleged top
leadership of the largest organized crime families,2 these cases exemplify
the sweeping reach of the powers granted to federal prosecutors by the
1. See, e.g., United States v. Persisco, 621 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Indict-
ment, United States v. Rastelli, No. 85 Cr. 00354 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 13, 1985); Indict-
ment, United States v. Colombo, No. 85 Cr. 00244 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 22, 1985);
Indictment, United States v. Salerno, No. 85 Cr. 139 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 26, 1985);
Indictment, United States v. Badalamenti, No. 84 Cr. 236 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 19, 1985);
Indictment, United States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984). The
Persico indictment joines the alleged leader and 13 members of the Colombo organized
crime family in a 51-count RICO indictment charging labor-related bribery, extortion
and embezzlement, the theft and sale of stolen goods, loansharking, narcotics sales and
illegal gambling. See Persico, 621 F. Supp. at 850, 878. According to the indictment, all
of the group's criminal activities were facilitated by threats, beatings, murder, and the
public fear of the organization. See id. at 878. The indictment also specifically charges
that seven of the defendants attempted to bribe a federal prison official and a special IRS
agent to illegally assist incarcerated or fugitive family members. See id. at 878-79.
The 78-count Castellano indictment joins the alleged leader of the Gambino crime fam-
ily with 23 other defendants. See Indictment at 1, Castellano. The charges include 25
murders, extortion, drug dealing and the operation of a huge international car theft ring.
See id. at 19. The current trial was interrupted by the widely publicized murder of Paul
Castellano and a close associate. See Sullivan, Sensational Killings Fill Crime Families
History, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at B12, col. 4.
The Badalamenti indictment joines 37 defendants, alleged to be affiliated with the Bon-
nano organized crime family, charging them with participation in a massive heroin im-
portation conspiracy described in the press as the "Pizza Connection." See Indictment at
11, Badalamenti.
The Salerno indictment joins nine alleged leaders of the five principal organized crime
families of New York City. See Indictment at 9-11, Salerno. The indictment charges that
the five families have operated as a confederation to promote and reap the benefits of
organized criminal activity in the United States since the early 1930's. See id. at 2-9.
The Rasetelli indictment joins 17 defendants including the alleged leader and key mem-
bers of the Bonnano crime family. See Indictment at 1, 8-10, Rastelli. The indictment
charges that the defendants illegally dominated the moving and storage industry in the
New York area through their control of a labor union local. See id. at 4-6.
The Colombo indictment joins the alleged leader and key members of a "crew" within
the Colombo crime family. See Indictment at 2, Colombo. The charges, encompassing
ten years of activity, include murder, assault, extortion, narcotics theft, possession and
sale, loansharking, arson, the attempted murder of an informant and the bribery of a
potential witness. See id at 2-5.
All of these cases involve the Mafia, the core group within organized crime. See
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 Temp. L.Q. 1009, 1013 n.15 (1980); Organ-
ized Robbery, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 2, 1986, at 7, col. 3.
For a small sample of the publicity surrounding these trials, see infra note 698.
For a discussion of the current attacks on organized crime, see Winerip, High Profile
Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 44, 46.
2. See supra note 1. See McFadden, Expert Cites Gains Against Mafia, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1985, at B2, col. 5 (current trials "pose major threats to entire leadership of mob
in New York").
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1970 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).3
The defendants not only confront long prison terms, but they also face
the prospect of severe financial penalties. The stakes are high on both
sides and the trials pose significant legal and practical problems for the
presiding judges.' One issue of particular concern to legal observers is
the use of anonymous juries.
In some of these cases, attorneys selected a jury from a panel of pro-
spective jurors whose names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds and religious
affiliations remain unknown to either side.6 This unusual procedure,
designed to protect jurors from outside influence and the fear of retalia-
tion,7 has occasionally been used in New York federal courts8 since the
celebrated trial of drug kingpin Leroy "Nicky" Barnes.9 Despite appar-
3. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)); Brill, Surprisel
They're Winning the War on the Mafia, Am. Law., Dec. 1985, at 1, 25-28 (positing that
the current trials represent the belated "flowering" of RICO's power); Stille, On Trial-
The Mafia Cases, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 6, col. 1 ("[Castellano] indictment ...
aimed at nothing less than putting on entire criminal organization in jail. It tried to bring
the whole chain of command-from the lowly car thief and hitman to the alleged 'boss,'
Paul Castellano-under the broad reach of [RICO]").
4. See, e.g., Indictment at 35-43, United States v. Rastelli, No. 85 Cr. 00354
(E.D.N.Y. filed June 13, 1985) (government seeking forfeiture of all defendants' interests
in Teamsters Local 814 as well as approximately $500,000); Indictment at 19-26, United
States v. Colombo, No. 85 Cr. 00244 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 22, 1985) (government seeking
forfeiture of approximately $3.7 million in property and proceeds); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (providing for forfeiture of interests gained from or used in
violation of RICO); Brill, supra note 3, at 25-26 (RICO allows prosecutors to seize con-
victed racketeers' interests in union locals through which they derived income). See gen-
erally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 1 (RICO provides means to both break
organizations economically and to punish individual members).
5. See Stille, supra note 3, at 6, col. I ("judges and lawyers . . . are trying to cope
with racketeering cases of a size and complexity that stretch the traditional dimensions of
criminal law"); cf United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 547 (5th Cir. 1986) (RICO
cases are unusually complex and provide many possibilities for confusion and ambiguity).
6. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 876-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Smothers, A Mixed Verdict on Anonymous Jurors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4 (Week
in Review), at 6, col. 3. Attorneys are not usually permitted to inquire into religious and
ethnic affiliations, see United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1980); Annot., 28 A.L.R. Fed. 26, §§ 14-15, at 79-81 (1976), but, as
a practical matter, can often infer such information from names and addresses. See
Abramovsky, Juror Safety: The Presumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir Dire in
Federal Criminal Prosecutions-Are They Endangered Species?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 30,
49-51 (1981).
7. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert,
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 124 (1985); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1984).
Recently, a state judge declined to empanel an anonymous jury for the assault trial of a
reputed organized crime figure because the state's criminal procedure laws apparently did
not permit it. See Fried, Bid for Anonymous Jury in Gotti Trial is Denied, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 8, 1986, at 31, col. 1.
9. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 131-33 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
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ent benefits, 10 critics assail anonymous juries both as an infringment of
the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury"1 and as a serious
U.S. 907 (1980). Prior to trial, the government moved to have the jury sequestered to
avoid any possibility of jury tampering that allegedly infected three earlier narcotics cases
prosecuted in the Southern District of New York. See id. at 134 n.3. The trial judge not
only granted the motion, id. at 136, but also conducted a limited voir dire, specifically
refusing to disclose to either side the names, addresses and neighborhoods of prospective
jurors. See id. at 133-34. The judge also refused to inquire into the prospective jurors'
ethnic and religious backgrounds. See id. at 134, 137. Prospective jurors were, however,
asked to disclose the counties they resided in. Id. at 135.
On appeal, defendants claimed that the limited voir dire deprived them of their ability
to meaningfully probe jurors' biases and prejudices and thus violated due process. See id.
at 137. The Second Circuit held that the extensive voir dire conducted by the judge gave
the defendants a fair opportunity to expose biases or prejudices. See id. at 142-43. More-
over, any prejudices arguably inferable from the undisclosed information were discovera-
ble through direct questioning about matters and issues involved in the trial. See id. at
142. The Second Circuit also flatly rejected the defendant's claim that jurors must dis-
close their identities and publicly take responsibility for their decisions. See id. at 140.
The court did not sanction the practice for every case but found that, in light of the
seriousness of the charges, the extensive pretrial publicity and indications of defendants'
willingness to interfere with the judicial system, the decision to limit voir dire was proper
and necessary "to protect the jury, to assure its privacy, and to avoid all possible mental
blocks against impartiality." Id. at 141. The court also stated that an actual threat or
incident of jury tampering was not, and would not, be necessary to justify the procedure.
See id. The procedure has been used a number of times since Barnes but only in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. See, eg., United States v. Ferguson, 758
F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 124 (1985); United States v. Rosado, 728
F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1984).
Six years after Barnes, in a factually related case, United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359, 1362 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985), defendants convicted by an anony-
mous jury again challenged the practice before the Second Circuit. This time, they
claimed that telling jurors to guard their identities effectively violated defendants' right to
be presumed innocent unless, and until, proven guilty. See id. at 1363. Taking the cue
from Barnes, the government had moved, prior to trial, to have voir dire conducted with-
out disclosure of veniremens' names, addresses or places of employment to protect them
from intimidation or the fear of retaliation. See id. at 1362. In support of the motion, the
government alleged that defendants murdered suspected government witnesses, put a
"contract" out on "Nicky" Barnes, who had by this time become a government inform-
ant, and that the seriousness of the charges left defendants little to lose by tampering with
the jury. See id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit conceded that the practice might burden the presump-
tion of innocence somewhat but held that there was no per se rule that it may not be
burdened. Id. at 1364. Moreover, the court found that any possible prejudice was mini-
mized by the judge's credible explanation to the jury that their identities were being con-
cealed to prevent the media and the public from invading their privacy and influencing
their deliberations. See id. at 1364-65 & n.1. The court concluded that "[u]pon balanc-
ing the government's interest in safeguarding jurors with the defendant's interest in
avoiding erosion of the presumption of innocence, the scale in this case tips in the govern-
ment's favor." Id. at 1365. While use of the procedure proceeds apace in New York, see
supra note 1 and accompanying text, it is not currently being used in any other federal
district courts.
10. See infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text.
11. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 30-31; Note, The Peremptory Challenge in a
Criminal Case After United States v. Barnes, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 173, 173-74
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Peremptory Challenge].
The sixth amendment expressly guarantees the defendant a trial before an impartial
jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to challenge prospective jurors theoretically
1986]
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and unnecessary erosion of the presumption of innocence12
Since many attorneys believe trials are frequently won or lost during
jury selection," any procedure diminishing the role of counsel invites
close scrutiny and criticism. Opponents of anonymous juries argue that
the procedure restricts meaningful voir dire and thereby undermines the
defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. 4 Critics also
enables counsel to eliminate individuals whose manifest or suspected biases render them
incapable of reaching an impartial verdict. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 24 (prescribing methods for examining and disqualifying
prospective jurors). Initially, either the parties or the trial judge elicit information from
prospective jurors through voir dire. See generally V. Starr & M. McCormick, Jury Se-
lection §§ 8.0-9.0 (1985) (summarizing vior dire procedures and techniques). Based on
this information, both sides may tactically invoke two types of challenges to disqualify
prospective jurors-an unlimited number of challenges for cause and statutorily pre-
scribed number of peremptory challenges. See id. § 10.4, at 302. A challenge for cause is
based on an actual admission of bias or on a response that betrays a prejudice judicially
recognized as mandating automatic dismissal. See id. at 303. Peremptory challenges,
however, require no justification and reflect an attorney's instincts, hunches or suspicions
about prospective jurors who cannot be challenged for cause. See P. DiPerna, Juries on
Trial 151 (1984).
The effectiveness of both types of challenge depends on the breadth of information
elicited during voir dire. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 47. Although courts often
permit wide latitude in questioning prospective jurors, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 218-19 (1965), the trial judge enjoys broad discretion in conducting voir dire and
satisfies the sixth amendment as long as "he permit[s] at least some questioning with
respect to any material issue that may arise, actually or potentially, in the trial." United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980);
accord United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1184 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Juror anonymity forcloses inquiry into
the names and addresses of prospective jurors, thus precluding challenges on these
grounds.
12. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 30-31; Smothers, supra note 6, at 6, col. 3.
The presumption of innocence is an integral component of a fair criminal trial. Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
While an explicit instruction articulating the presumption need not be given in every case,
see Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979), the trial judge must adequately
instruct the jury on the prosecution's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978). Because the
jury's verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented at trial, id. at 485, the
presumption also directs the jury to ignore the nonevidentiary aspects of the criminal
process that might otherwise encourage them to presume guilt. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 533 (1979). Obvious examples of potential non-evidentiary influences are the
arrest, the indictment, id., the prosecutor's opening and closing statements, see Hardee v.
Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1978), and, perhaps, the defendant's failure to
present evidence or take the stand, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (quoting
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-84 n.12 (1978)); Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d
766, 773 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985). Preserv-
ing the presumption of innocence also requires the court to evaulate any other trial tac-
tics, procedures or circumstances that might undermine the jury's ability to entertain the
presumption. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-4 (1976).
13. See, e.g., I. Owen, Defending Criminal Cases Before Juries: A Common Sense
Approach 92, 109 (1973); V. Starr & M. McCormick, supra note 20, § 3.8, at 75 (quoting
H. Zeisel, The American Jury: Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advo-
cacy in the United States 84 (1977)).
14. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dissent-
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claim that jurors interpret their anonymity as proof of the defendant's
criminal proclivity, thereby subverting the presumption of innocence. 15
Nevertheless, this Note argues that anonymous juries neither undermine
the sixth amendment nor meaningfully dilute the presumption of
innocence.
Part I analyzes the argument that anonymous juries impermissibly
erode the presumption of innocence and suggests that this proposition
rests on dubious assumptions concerning juror psychology. Moreover,
anonymity protects jurors while raising inferences far less threatening to
the presumption of innocence than other established practices designed
to ensure the integrity and safety of the judicial process. Part II discusses
whether the effect of juror anonymity on voir dire denies due process or
violates the sixth amendment and concludes that the defendant has an
interest in, but no constitutional right to, the undisclosed information.
In fact, some possible advantages accrue to the defendant. Still, the trial
judge should disclose certain information about jurors, in lieu of identity,
to attorneys who request it. Part III examines the need for anonymous
juries and concludes that in certain cases jurors may either fear retalia-
tion or actually be exposed to intimidation unless the court employs
measures to conceal their identities. Finally, Part IV recommends a
standard for deciding whether to empanel an anonymous jury.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
No per se rule prohibits burdening the presumption of innocence to
accommodate a competing right or vital interest.16 Juror anonymity,
though unusual,17 strikes a reasonable balance between the defendant's
right to be cloaked in innocence and society's need to protect jurors and
preserve the integrity of the trial.'8
A. Analogous Security Measures
In Illinois v. Allen, 9 the Supreme Court suggested that in extreme cir-
cumstances shackling and gagging might be an appropriate way to con-
ing), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 30-31, 49; Peremp-
tory Challenge, supra note 11, at 173-74
15. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 30-31, 35, 37; Smothers, supra note 6, at 6, col.
3. See infra notes 37-38, 50 and accompanying text.
16. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970); Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d
1409, 1413 (1lth Cir. 1984); Billups v. Garrison, 718 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S. CL 91 (1984); Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1983).
17. Although the procedure is unusual, it is not unprecedented. Some Ninth Circuit
opinions upheld the practice of concealing prospective jurors' identities from the trial
participants. See Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. de-
nied, 362 U.S. 937 (1960); Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959); Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 276-80 (9th Cir.
1958), cert denied, 359 U.S. 916 (1959).
18. See infra notes 37-89 and accompanying text.
19. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
1986]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
trol a disruptive defendant even though it would clearly prejudice the
defendant in a juror's eyes.20 That severe remedy, only contemplated in
Allen,"' has been employed in a number of cases.22 More commonly,
trial judges use other measures to insulate the trial from violence and
other illegal interference.23 When confronted with situations involving
threats of disruption or violence, appellate courts have upheld use of
such extraordinary safeguards as extra security personnel,24 courthouse
metal detectors, 5 limited cross-examination,26 courtroom closure27 and
20. See id. at 343-44 (dictum).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 221-22 (Ist Cir. 1982). Most cases
following Allen, however, permitted physical restraint of defendants when they pose a
threat of escape or violence rather than just to the orderly conduct of the trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284-85 (5th Cir.) (defendant who assaulted two
officers, escaped from custody on a number of occasions and disrupted the principal case
as well as other cases, was properly shackled throughout trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898
(1976); Bibbs v. Wyrick, 526 F.2d 226, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant who rose to his
feet, announced that he would not be tried with his present attorney, and began to move
toward the bench and an exit, and whose own attorney recommended that strong court
officers be assigned to the case, was properly handcuffed on the first day of trial), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976); United States v. Kress, 451 F.2d 576, 577 (9th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (twice-convicted bank robber who had previously escaped from custody was
properly handcuffed throughout trial), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972). The decision to
restrain a defendant need not be based on a defendant's conduct during the trial. See
Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 111 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959
(1974).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.) (unusually high
number of security guards within the courtroom and around court building was appropri-
ate security measure for trial of two prison inmates charged with attempted murder in
light of the large number of inmates testifying and the apparent "interest" of a terrorist
group in the outcome of the trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976); United States ex reL
Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir.) (exclusion of public during testimony of
undercover narcotics agents was proper and necessary to ensure confidentiality and safety
of agents), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 788
(9th Cir.) (the use of an electronic metal detector and the presence of federal marshals
was appropriate on last day of trial after court received threats, spectators had been dis-
ruptive, and a demonstration was planned), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974); Kennedy
v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 103, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1973) (court properly permitted defend-
ant to be shackled to an officer in light of defendant's previous escape from jail), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1966)
(jury was properly sequestered at nearby naval base in light of allegations of jury tamper-
ing and notoriety of the trial), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
24. See United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 963 (1976); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 108 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 959 (1974).
25. See United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1088 (1974).
26. See United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United States v. Cavallaro, 553 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977).
27. See United States ex rel Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1273-74 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). Although limited cross-examination, see supra note 26, and
courtroom closure are usually challenged on sixth amendment grounds, see, e.g., United
States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983); United States v. Cavallaro, 553 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977); United States ex rel.
Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1273-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 973 (1975).
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sequestration of the jury.2 8
These situations, however, require a particularly difficult balancing of
interests.2 9 The presumption of innocence and juror safety cannot be
weighed against each other as abstract principles. Rather, a court must
consider the degree of prejudice to the defendant and the magnitude of
the threat to jurors.3" Because prejudice depends on the procedure's im-
pact on a juror's state of mind,3 the court must engage in a psychologi-
cal guessing game with uncertain results.3 2 The conflicting assumptions
about a jury's reaction to a defendant tried in prison clothes demonstrate
the inherent subjectivity of any conclusions. In Estelle v. Williams, 3 3 the
Supreme Court observed that defendants should not be forced to attend
trial in prison clothes because their appearance could undermine the pre-
sumption of innocence.34 At the same time, the Court noted that defense
attorneys often produce their clients in prison uniforms to elicit juror
sympathy.35 Thus, even something that initially seems unambiguously
prejudicial to the defendant can raise the opposite inference.
Although the prison uniform example demonstrates the difficulty of
predicting juror reaction to a challenged practice, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[c]ourts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely
effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common
human experience. ' ' 36  Although it cannot preclude competing infer-
ences, common sense can and should govern conclusions concerning the
effect of juror anonymity.
B. Juror Reaction to Anonymity
Unlike security measures that unequivocally point to the defendant,
juror anonymity could be perceived to address potential disturbances
wholly unrelated to the defendant. Yet, critics of the anonymous jury
contend that prospective jurors could only read the anonymity instruc-
courts have recognized that measures taken to protect witnesses may undermine the pre-
sumption of innocence, see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
28. See United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1966), vacated per
curiam on other grounds, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
29. See United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 963 (1976).
30. See Zygaldo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 941 (1983); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 963 (1976).
31. See infra notes 37-93 and accompanying text.
32. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
33. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
34. See id. at 504.
35. See id. at 508; cf Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1977) (jurors who
inadvertently saw defendant in custody of officers may have felt sympathy rather than
hostility).
36. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976).
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tion to be a judicial conclusion of the defendant's guilt.37 Therefore, they
cannot obey the contradictory instruction to presume the defendant in-
nocent until the government meets its burden of proof.3 Although plau-
sible, this conclusion necessarily depends on certain unsupported
assumptions about juror perception and knowledge.
For example, one writer suggests that, based on prospective jurors'
prior jury experience, they would know that their names and addresses
are usually disclosed to the parties.39 Accordingly, they could only con-
clude that these defendants are being singled out.4" Prior jury sevice,
however, may not have appeared to be substantially different from serv-
ing on an anonymous jury.4 1 Depending on the circumstances of a case
and the style of the judge and the attorneys, the substance and length of
voir dire can vary significantly.42 Although the criminal defense bar usu-
ally supports extensive, unrestrained voir dire in principle,4 3 a particular
voir dire may be so cursory that prospective jurors might not even be
aware that a defendant has access to their names and addresses. 44 In-
deed, jurors' names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds and religions have all
been withheld from attorneys in the past.45 The Barnes decision was
unique only because it foreclosed inquiry into all four areas at once.46
Thus, there is no rigid, standardized voir dire format with which even an
experienced juror could compare a particular voir dire and conclude that
something suspicious was afoot.
If awareness of the irregularity of the limited voir dire were the sole
source of prejudice, then the trial judge could avoid prejudice to the de-
fendant by excusing all experienced jurors and those indicating special
37. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 35; Smothers, supra note 6, at 6, col. 3.
38. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 35.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Factors unrelated to anonymity may, of course, indicate to jurors that a trial is
unusual. Pretrial publicity, see infra note 78, press coverage of the jury selection process
itself, see, e.g., Big Cases Focus Attention on Jury Selection, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at
B 11, col. 1; Anonymous Juries Being Picked for 2 Trials Focusing on Organized Crime,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at B1, cols. 1, 6, and the size of the venire drawn, see P.
DiPerna, supra note 11, at 99, are all indications of an unusual case.
42. See V. Starr & M. McCormick, supra note 11, at 241, 242 n.2.
43. See id. at 425.
44. See National Jury Project, Inc., Jurywork: Systematic Techniques § 2.02, at 2-2
(2d ed. 1986) (except in notorious cases, attorneys rarely pay attention to voir dire); V.
Starr & M. McCormick, supra note 11, at 75, 223 (some attorneys accept the first 12
prospective jurors without examination); 30 Am. Jur. Trials 563 (1983) (same).
45. See, e.g., Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 1967) (no right to
jurors' religious backgrounds); Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
1959) (no right to jurors' addresses), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 937 (1960); Wagner v. United
States, 264 F.2d 524, 527-28 (9th Cir.) (no right to jurors' names), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959); see also Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 41. The defendants in Barnes did not
claim that jurors' ethnic and religious backgrounds or exact addresses need to be dis-
closed in every case. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
46. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 41.
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knowledge of the judicial system. While the average person probably
anticipates some screening to detect partiality or incompetence,4 7 it is
unlikely that he or she would expect, with absolute certainty, to have to
divulge any particular item of personal information to the parties.
The issue, however, is not whether juries perceive anonymity as rou-
tine or unusual. In almost every case, the trial judge explains to jurors
that, due to the trial's notoriety, anonymity is necessary to prevent the
media and the public from invading their privacy and impairing their
impartiality."a The propriety of using anonymous juries hinges on the
credibility of this explanation.49
Critics claim that jurors read through this facially neutral instruction
because no juror would believe he was being insulated from anyone other
than the defendants or their sympathizers.'* Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, this assumption would require judges to refrain from making any
suggestion concerning the jurors' extra-judicial contacts, lest defendants
be cast in a negative light. In every case, however, the trial judge is re-
quired to make some effort to caution the jury against extra-judicial influ-
ences.5" Indeed, many convicted defendants successfully argue on appeal
that the jury was either not adequately cautioned to avoid outside influ-
ences or that juror contact with third parties prejudiced the defendant's
case.
52
Cases that inspire significant media attention and public passion raise
special concerns about juror insulation.5 3 The effect of inflammatory me-
dia reports and hostile public opinion on a defendant's fair trial rights
has long perplexed judges.5 4 When notorious criminals are tried, a juror
47. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior CL, 464 U.S. 501, 513 n.1 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (most prospective jurors are aware that they will be questioned to detect
biases).
48. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980).
49. If courts used the procedure without comment, the question would be whether it
was innately suggestive. Arguably, jurors would not perceive the procedures as anything
unusual. Cf Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330, 331 n.1, 332 (2d Cir. 1978) (the jury
would perceive the presence of security as a normal courtroom practice and not one that
singled out defendant). Someone unfamiliar with trial procedures might assume that he
would not have to reveal his identity to a person who may be exposed to a lengthy prison
sentence as a result of the former's verdict.
50. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 35.
51. See United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1980); Annot., 72
A.L.R.3d 131, 158-59 (1976).
52. See, eg., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-74 (1965); Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954); United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744, 745-46 (8th
Cir. 1980). Moreover, unsanctioned contacts with jurors during trial are presumptively
prejudicial. Project, Criminal Procedure, 72 Geo. L.J. 249, 558 (1983).
53. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press--Fair Trial"Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 394-400 (1968) (recommendations in response to





could easily feel pressure to act as a public avenger and thus could be-
lieve that his anonymity is aimed, at least in part, at isolating the jury
from forces and opinions hostile to the defendants." In many highly
publicized cases, for example, the defense counsel will move to sequester
the jury to prevent public pressure or prejudicial information from bias-
ing jurors against his client. 6 Presumably, these attorneys do not fear
that sequestered jurors will conclude that they are being insulated from
the defendant. Although a juror might logically conclude that anonym-
ity prevents, among other things, a defendant from influencing him, any
measure designed to insulate the jury from prejudicial elements could
raise this inference. 57 Because some effort is always made to caution the
55. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1984) ("Criminal
acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even outrage and hostility;
this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done.");
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 342 (1966) (prospective jurors were exposed to inter-
ference by cranks and friends and all prospective jurors received anonymous letters); cf
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 Iowa L. Rev.
837, 837 (1980) (RICO enacted in hysterical atmosphere reminiscent of Red Scares of the
1920's and 1950's). A number of cases have actually involved attempts to persuade the
jury to convict defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983); United States v. Hamilton, 490 F.2d 451, 452 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 416 (D. Utah 1984).
In United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960
(1965), the Second Circuit suggested that juror anonymity might be necessary to prevent
jury tampering or intimidation in certain types of cases. See id. at 392. That suggestion
came in response to letters received by certain jurors which read: "Find these guinea sons
of bitches guilty. Dont [sic] let them get away with something they did a long time ago.
Send them to jail now, all those Mafia bums." Id. Ironically, a number of the jurors
perceived the letters as a veiled attempt to discourage conviction. Id.
A recent incident involving the highly publicized trial of a former Navy radioman
accused of spying for the Soviet Union demonstrates the believability of the courts' con-
cern with potential media interference in sensational cases. See Letter Sent to Jurors by a
News Reporter Disrupts a Spy Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at B8, col. 4 (judge de-
scribed reporter's letters to jurors as being close to an attempt to influence jury).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1241 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 154-55 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979); Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156, 168 (8th
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 716 (1961); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp.
408, 416-17 (D. Utah 1984).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1966) (defendants
objected to sequestration of jurors at a naval base), vacated per curiam on other grounds,
387 U.S. 231 (1967). Moreover, jurors are occasionally sequestered at the government's
request, see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 996 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982), and a number of opinions concerning prejudicial juror contact with
third parties involved attempts by the defendant's own friends, relatives or sympathizers
to influence the jury, see, e.g., United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 456-57 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953, 954-55 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Harry Barfield Co., 359 F.2d 120, 121-24
(5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585, 623-25 (E.D. Pa. 1979). A
number of opinions expressly refer to the need to prevent jury tampering or intimidation,
as well as the need to protect the defendant from hostile publicity, as reasons for seques-
tering the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1966),
vacatedper curiam on other grounds, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); United States v. Panczko, 353
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jury against any outside influence,5" and defense attorneys in sensational
or notorious cases occasionally move to sequester the jury,59 it seems
illogical to conclude that juror anonymity could be perceived only as pre-
sumptive evidence of a defendant's guilt.
Perhaps the most significant distinction between anonymous juries and
more established security measures is that the latter are usually a con-
stant, overt presence during trial." In Estelle v. Williams,6 Chief Justice
Burger observed that forcing the accused to go to trial wearing prison
clothes was intolerable because the uniform was "a constant reminder of
the accused's condition"62 and "likely to be a continuing influence
throughout the trial."63 Similarly, in ruling on challenges to either phys-
ical restraint of the defendant or extraordinary courtroom security meas-
ures, courts often emphasize the defendant's right to the physical indicia
of innocence during trial. 4
Thus, whether a particular safety measure impermissibly burdens the
presumption of innocence depends in part on how pervasively it colors
the actual conduct of the trial. For example, if a murder defendant
claims self-defense and both parties present character evidence, gagging
and shackling the defendant obviously would favor the government's the-
ory. Although the phrase "anonymous jury" inspires an image of
hooded jurors in secret proceedings,65 anonymous jurors perceive no
overt difference between the conduct of an anonymous jury trial and a
conventional one. The defendant is neither saddled with the physical
indicia of guilt nor is he forced to face the charges in an atmosphere of
imminent violence. Moreover, many trials using anonymous juries are
complex and take many months, decreasing the likelihood that the brief
pretrial instruction66-- one among many the jury will hear67-might con-
sciously or subconsciously influence the jury's verdict.68
F.2d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); United States ex rel.
Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199, 205.06 (D.N.J. 1971).
58. See United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1980).
59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Gambina, 564 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1977) (large number
of security guards throughout trial); United States v. Kress, 451 F.2d 576, 577 (9th Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (defendant handcuffed throughout trial), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923
(1972).
61. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
62. Id. at 504.
63. Id. at 505.
64. See United States v. Gambina, 564 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Card-
well, 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974).
65. See the whimsical cartoon accompanying Smothers, supra note 6, at 6, col. 3,
depicting jurors holding masks to their faces.
66. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.l (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 66, 67 (1985).
67. Cf United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 443 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (36-count,
multi-defendant RICO trial would be lengthy in light of extensive jury instructions and
complexity of trial), afl'd sub nom. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
68. Cf United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 71 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (possible
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Even assuming that the anonymity instruction signals the jury that the
defendants might "get" to them,69 critics of anonymous juries ignore a
likely consequence of that perception. A juror who anticipates a defend-
ant's retaliation would be more likely to return a guilty verdict despite
such fears rather than because of them.70 Thus, even if anonymity inci-
dentally instills the fear it attempts to remedy, 7' the result arguably bene-
fits the defendant by making jurors afraid to convict."2 On the other
hand, if anonymity helps to remedy existing fears, it serves the ideal of
dispassionate judgment. 73 Although a defendant would understandably
welcome trial before a jury biased toward acquittal, the people, as well as
the defendant, are entitled to an impartial jury.74
Of course, a juror may interpret anonymity as a measure designed only
to prevent jury tampering, not as a measure protecting him from a vio-
lent defendant. The question then becomes whether this inference preju-
dicially alters the juror's perception of a defendant. One defense attorney
in a recent organized crime trial claimed that the anonymity instruction
convinced the jurors that "these men are members of the Mafia." '75
Although jurors in the current organized crime cases may have such an
impression,76 it is probably neither caused nor exacerbated by anonym-
ity. Whether jurors perceive their anonymity as a measure designed to
prevent tampering or violence, it does little to alter their perception of
certain defendants.77
The current series of organized crime trials and related events have
provided a steady stream of colorful headlines for the press.78 Moreover,
a number of the defendants had public, criminal reputations long before
influence of juror's pretrial impressions of defendant's guilt was greatly reduced by three-
month period of sequestration during trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
69. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 35.
70. See Owens v. Estelle, 484 F. Supp. 230, 233 (W.D. Tex. 1979), afJ'd mem., 611
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 35.
72. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
74. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
75. See Smothers, supra note 6, at 6, col. 3.
76. See Bowles, Gotti Jury Pool Deep, N.Y. Newsday, Apr. 8, 1986, at 5, col. I (many
prospective jurors expressed belief in Mafia and suspicion based on news accounts that
defendant was the leader of a crime family).
77. Cf. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (most qualified jurors have some
pretrial impressions or opinions of merits of important, publicized cases).
78. See, e.g., McFadden, Expert Cites Gains Against Mafia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23,
1985, at B2, col. 5; Roberts, Mafia Infiltration of Business Costing Consumers Millions,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at A1, col. 1; Sullivan, Sensational Killings Fill Crime Fami-
lies' History, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1985, at B12, col. 4; Farber, U.S.-Italian Teamwork
Bringing Organized-Crime Chiefs to Trial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 3; F.B.L
Begins Roundup Aimed at Mob Leaders, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984, § 4 (Week In Re-
view), at 6, col. 1; Lubasch, 31 Charged by U.S. with Running a $1.65 Billion Heroin
Operation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
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these trials began.79 Furthermore, the indictments, which are read to
jurors before trial,"0 allege that the defendants are members of organized
crime families" l familiar to anyone who occasionally reads the paper or
watches television. 2 These defendants understandably complain that
pervasive publicity infects the jury and destroys the possibility of a fair
trial.8 3 Nevertheless, the courts have consistently held that jurors need
not be completely oblivious to the facts underlying a particular case."
Pretrial impressions or opinions will not disqualify a juror if, in the
court's judgment, he can set aside such impressions and base his decision
solely on the evidence admitted at trial.8" While a juror's ability to ig-
nore pervasive media coverage may be questionable,86 critics of anony-
mous juries seem to presume that jurors are oblivious to the nature of
these cases until they are directed not to reveal their identities. Only
then, supposedly, are their minds irrevocably poisoned against the de-
fendants. Unless defense attorneys-who would normally be the last to
concede a juror's ability to ignore publicity and the indictment-can em-
panel twelve hermits oblivious to current events, the media and the in-
dictment, this theory of causation is highly improbable.
Ultimately, the results of an anonymous jury trial should most reliably
79. See, e.g., Fried, Persico and 3 Indicted in I.R.S. biribe Attempt Case, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 8, 1980, at A27, col. 1; Nephew of Mob Figure Is Wounded in "Village", N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1979, at A32, col. 5; Lubasch, A Reputed Mobster's 2d Tax Trial Ends in
a Mistrial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1977, at B21, col. 2; Crime Figure on Trial, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 21, 1977, at B3, col. 6; Seigel, Key Witness Jailed For Not Testifying at Castellano
Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1976, at A29, col. 1; Loan Shark Trial Opens, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 1976, at B3, col. 6; Hiacker of Truck Loses His Freedom Because of Cohorts,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1976, at A16, col. 1.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1455 (10th Cir.) (prosecutor read
indictment to jury before giving opening statement), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 239 (1985);
United States v. London, 753 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1985) (court read indictment to jury
before instructing them that government must prove charges contained therein).
81. See supra note 1.
82. See supra notes 78-79.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, No. 85 Cr. 139 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1986) (de-
fendant moved for a trial delay because of potentially prejudicial publicity) (available
May 5, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); United States v. Persico, No. 84 Cr.
809 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1986) (defendants alleged that a lead article on organized crime in
a popular magazine written by the President of the United States was an intentional effort
to prejudice the defendants) (available May 5, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
84. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961); United States v. Medina, 761
F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158, 1162 n.6, 1162-64
(6th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d
31, 59-64 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
85. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961); United States v. Medina, 761
F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158, 1162 n.6, 1162-64
(6th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d
31, 59-64 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
86. One critic of anonymous juries noted that a defense attorney would actually be-
come suspicious of any prospective juror who disclaimed any knowledge or impressions
of the facts underlying a particularly sensational case and would almost certainly exercise
a peremptory challenge against him. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 41.
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indicate the prejudicial impact of the procedure, if any.87 Thus far, these
results suggest that the prejudicial impact of the procedure is remote.
Only one of the trials resulted in the conviction of all defendants on all
counts, 88 and at least one of the cases resulted in a surprising disappoint-
ment for the government.8 9 Apparently, the procedure did not prevent
jurors from differentiating between individual defendants and counts in
complex cases. While such results cannot conclusively refute the argu-
ment that anonymity prejudices a juror's judgment, they demonstrate
that the argument is, at least, vastly overstated.
Anonymity alone does not target a defendant for conviction.90 By in-
structing a jury that anonymity prevents the media and interested mem-
bers of the public from interfering with their deliberations, a trial judge
avoids most prejudicial innuendo.9' Unlike other permissible safety pre-
cautions, 92 juror anonymity does not even intrude on the actual conduct
of the trial. 93 Consequently, an anonymous jury does not undermine the
presumption of innocence.
II. LIMITED VOIR DIRE AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Consistent with due process and the sixth amendment,9 4 the trial judge
may refuse to ask prospective jurors any questions not reasonably calcu-
lated to expose biases or prejudices relevant to the case.95 Although ad-
dresses and group affiliations may, in some circumstances, indicate
significant potential for bias, 96 attorneys do not have an unfettered right
87. Cf United States v. Capo, 595 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1979) (acquittal of four
defendants supported judge's conclusion that jurors were impartial), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 60 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (fact
that jury acquitted one defendant was some indication of impartiality), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 933 (1977).
88. In the one case where defendants were convicted on all counts, United States v.
Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit described the evidence as
"'overwhelming and undisputed." Id. at 96. In all the other reported cases, some of the
defendants were acquitted on all or some counts. See United States v. Ferguson, 758
F.2d 843, 847-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 124 (1985); United States v. Thomas,
757 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
89. See P. DiPerna, supra note 11, at 111 (discussing United States v. Ferguson and
suggesting that anonymity may have encouraged acquittals).
90. See supra notes 37-89 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
94. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV.
95. See United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
96. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189-90 (1981); United States v.
Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Airamovsky, supra note 6, at 49. Even
in such cases, however, group affiliations would not necessarily justify challenges for
cause. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 Yale L.J. 1715, 1733 & n.78 (1977) (no known cases where members of groups




to this information in every case.97 Denying access to these facts may
constrain an attorney's ability to assemble an ideal jury, but it violates no
constitutional right.98
Although the Barnes court may have been on firm constitutional
ground in rejecting the defendants' request for the ethnic and religious
backgrounds and addresses of prospective jurors,99 it unnecessarily
downplayed the relevance of this information to intelligent peremptory
challenges."° Indeed, racial, ethnic and socio-economic undercurrents
are present in every case involving an anonymous jury.'0 ' Trial judges
should acknowledge this fact and permit some inquiry into group affilia-
tions and approximate community in lieu of names and adresses. Be-
cause such disclosure does not undermine the purpose of juror
anonymity 2 and more than adequately substitutes for the information
97. See, ag., Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 1967) (no right to
jurors' religious backgrounds); Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
1959) (no right to jurors' addresses), cert denied, 362 U.S. 937 (1960); Wagner v. United
States, 264 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir.) (no right to jurors' names), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936
(1959); see also Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 41 (names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds
and religious affiliations have all been witheld before).
98. See Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
920 (1967); cf. Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 40 (during voir dire both parties seek to
empanel jurors partial to their side, not impartial jurors).
99. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
100. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 174 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dissent-
ing) (a peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror's group affiliations is the arche-
typical peremptory challenge), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
In a recent Supreme Court case, Batson v. Kentucky, 54 U.S.L.W. 4411 (U.S. Apr. 30,
1986), the Court overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), holding that a black
defendant could establish a prima facie violation of his equal protection rights based
solely on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury.
Id at 4429-30. While the decision has no immediate impact on defendants' use of dis-
criminatory challenges, Chief Justice Burger noted that the decision would eventually
lead to restraints on defendants' ability to exercise peremptory challenges based on race
or other group affiliations. Id. at 4438 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Marshall called for the complete elimination of peremptory challenges. Id. at
4431 (Marshall, J., concurring). If Justice Burger is correct, the decision undermines the
argument for disclosure of jurors' ethnic backgrounds in anonymous jury cases.
101. See, eg., United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir.) (radical black
organization responsible for murders and bank robberies), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 124
(1985); United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 91-93 (2d Cir. 1984) (Puerto Rican terror-
ist group responsible for periodic bombings throughout the United States); United States
v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1979) (predominantly black criminal organiza-
tion responsible for narcotics distribution in New York and, indirectly, for drug related
crime, neighborhood deterioration and resulting racial and ethnic tension), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980); Indictment at 2-5, United States v. Salerno, No. 85 Cr. 139
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 26, 1985) (predominantly Italian organized crime confederation re-
sponsible for widespread, diverse criminal activities since the 1930's).
102. The description of approximate community should be broad enough to prevent
the parties from investigating jurors' immediate neighborhoods and talking to their fami-




normally inferable from names and addresses,10 3 it should be permitted
in every case using the procedure.
Some aspects of juror anonymity may even work to a defendant's ad-
vantage. Assuming attorneys are able to discern subtle prejudices from a
prospective juror's group affiliations, '04 anonymity equally restrains both
sides from eliminating members of the jury pool with undesirable demo-
graphic characteristics.' 05 Although defense attorneys may be unable to
weed out jurors with group characteristics that are supposedly prejudi-
cial to criminal defendants 10 6 or particular types of defendants, 0 7 prose-
cutors will similarly be unable to detect jurors from supposedly
sympathetic groups.,o This equality of ignorance may favor defendants.
Because conviction requires a unanimous verdict,"° anonymity increases
the possibility of a hung jury by increasing the likelihood that jurors as-
sociated with religious, ethnic or socio-economic groups favoring partic-
ular defendants will "slip through" the voir dire.
One commentator has argued that equal access to information about
the jury panel is crucial to a fair voir dire.II0 He noted that, in the past,
prosecutors have had unilateral access to governmental agency data on
prospective jurors.I" Thus, the prosecution enjoys a potential systemic
advantage in every case. 12 He concludes that a relatively broad voir dire
is necessary to remedy this institutional disparity.' 13 One might more
readily conclude, however, that anonymous juries remedy this systemic
inequality. Without names and adresses, prosecutors could not take ad-
vantage of the superior informational and investigative resources of the
government. Anonymity thus ensures that both sides are on equal foot-
ing with regard to information about prospective jurors.
Although the limited voir dire is constitutional," 1 4 it prevents access to
information on which attorneys rely substantially in exercising their per-
emptory challenges." 5 Consequently, attorneys should have alternative
access to jurors' ethnic backgrounds and approximate community if the
103. Access to jurors' group affiliations is more helpful than knowing their names.
Inferring ethnic and religious background from a name is often guesswork. See
Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 49-5 1. Surnames do not always indicate ethnic background
and can sometimes be misleading.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denlied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
106. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 49-51.
107. See id.
108. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
109. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31.
110. Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 47-48.
111. Id. at 48; see also United States v. Payseur, 501 F.2d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 1974)
(government's unilateral access to information about jurors is not a ground for objection).
112. See Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 48-49.
113. See id at 60.
114. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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disclosure would not jeopardize jurors' security.' 16 Even without this
alternative inquiry, incidental advantages accruing to the defendant from
juror anonymity compensate for defense counsel's diminished capacity to
assert intelligent peremptory challenges.'
1 7
III. ARE ANONYMOUS JuRIEs NECESSARY?
Although the prejudicial impact of juror anonymity may be exagger-
ated, any intrusion on a defendant's fair trial rights is unjustified if ano-
nymity is unnecessary. 18 The need for anonymous juries rests on several
grounds.
A. Juror Fear
Juror anonymity rests on the assumption that at least some jurors will
be intimidated by the characterization of the defendants in the indict-
ment,119 the corresponding pretrial media attention 2 ' and, ultimately,
the evidence. 21 Consequently, some jurors may be unable to judge the
evidence impartially. 22 Critics complain that judges have imposed ano-
nymity without any indication from jurors that they were afraid."2
Although juror fear may be difficult to prove, assuming its existence is
not as specious as this criticism suggests.
First, the impracticality of judicial inquiry into this area is obvious.
As Judge Cardamone recently observed, if the jurors are not already ap-
prehensive, extensive questioning about such fears would certainly tend
to generate the fear the questions are designed to detect.' 24 Second,
while no juror expressed any fear of violence on the record in Barnes and
116. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
118. Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976) ("Unlike physical restraints,.
compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy."); Walker v.
Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir.) (practice of confining defendants to "prisoner
dock" served no essential policy that would justify burdening the presumption of inno-
cence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
119. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (indictment
charged that criminal enterprise depended on threats, beatings, murder and the public's
fear of the organization).
120. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979) (extensive pretrial
publicity detailed violent acts of trial participants), cert denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
121. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.) (evidence included
defendants discussing the murder of two government witnesses), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
124 (1985).
122. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 66 (1985).
123. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.) (defendant complained
that judge should have questioned prospective jurors about fears before deciding to em-
panel anonymous jury), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 124 (1985); Abramovsky, supra note 6, at
37 (no showing in Barnes that jurors would have felt threatened without anonymity).
124. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.) ("such interrogation
could well have created or heightened such fear"), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 124 (1985); cf.
United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 867 (7th Cir.) (defendant complained that judge
poisoned jurors' minds against defendant when judge asked jurors if they would fear for
1986]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
its progeny, jurors have voiced such fears in cases involving less notori-
ous defendants. 25 Most of the current cases using anonymous juries in-
volve powerful organized crime groups'26 whose public reputations for
corruption, intimidation and ruthlessness have become matters of con-
temporary folk wisdom. 27 In a recent racketeering case involving the
Teamsters union, a defense attorney commissioned a survey seeking to
assess local prejudices and attitudes that might support a motion for indi-
vidual examination of prospective jurors. 2 Ironically, the prosecutor
eventually used the same survey to support a successful anonymous jury
motion. 29 The survey strongly supported the assumption of juror appre-
hension in organized crime cases. 130
B. The Likelihood of Tampering
Another premise underlying the need for anonymous juries is that cer-
tain defendants or their sympathizers are likely to try to corrupt or in-
timidate the jury. 13  Critics assert that courts accept this premise despite
a "total absence of any evidence of jury tampering, or of a conspiracy to
their safety in the event that evidence convinced them of defendant's guilt), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 950 (1975).
125. See United States v. Grandison, No. 83-5165, slip op. at 5 (4th Cir. 1986)
(Although a juror who lived in an area where certain defendants also resided expressed
concerns about what might happen to her after trial, the judge refused to excuse the juror
or declare a mistrial.); United States v. Thomas, 632 F.2d 837, 841 (10th Cir.) (jurors
asked court officer if they had anything to fear from defendant after hearing testimony
that defendant threatened a witness), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980); Owens v. Estelle,
484 F. Supp. 230, 233 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (jurors expressed concern that defendant might
be writing down their names and addresses), affid mer., 611 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1980).
126. See supra note I.
127. See Organized Robbery, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 2, 1986, at 7, col. 3 (organized
crime, dominated by the Mafia, which will earn over $100 billion and cost 400,000jobs, is
an entrenched, pervasive phenomenon with influence in every major legitimate industry);
Brill, supra note 3, at 24 (Americans accept organized crime as part of fabric of American
life).
128. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Permit Counsel to Con-
duct the Examination of Prospective Jurors and to Conduct Such Examination Individu-
ally, Outside the Hearing of the Other Prosective Jurors at 4-6, United States v. Cody, 82
Cr. 00013 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
129. See Affidavit in Support of Government's Motion for Anonymous Selection and
Limited Sequestration of the Jury at 3, United States v. Cody, 82 Cr, 00013 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 1982).
130. See Memorandum, supra note 128, at 5 (large proportion of group surveyed asso-
ciated union leaders and the Teamsters union with the Mafia, missing people, violence,
coercion, corruption and organized crime). The survey itself did not mention organized
crime, see id. at 4-6, and the case did not involve members of organized crime families, see
United States v. Cody, 722 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984), although it was reported in the press that the defendant had connections to tile
Mafia. See Affirmation in Support of Defendant's Motion for a Change of Venue at 2-3,
United States v. Cody, 82 Cr. 00013 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1982). If, as the survey sug-
gests, jurors would be apprehensive in cases they perceive as having underlying organized
crime connections, jurors would certainly be apprehensive in cases actually involving or-
ganized crime figures and activities.
131. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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tamper, injure, or otherwise adversely affect a juror." 132
While not every anonymous jury case reveals a specific intent or at-
tempt to interfere with the jury, in each case defendants had demon-
strated a willingness to obstruct justice in ways significantly more serious
and risky than jury tampering. 33 Juror anonymity has coincided with
attempted bribery of government officials,' 34 threats to grand jurors and
prosecutors, 135 the murder of or threats to potential witnesses and sus-
pected informants, 136 and the bombing of a federal courthouse 37 as well
as, in certain cases, indications of jury tampering.138 If witnesses are
killed or intimidated and substantial evidence indicates that defendants
have engaged in other serious attempts to evade process, 39 it is reason-
able to believe that the defendants may also take less drastic steps, such
as making anonymous threatening phone calls to jurors. Furthermore,
the factors demonstrating an inclination toward jury tampering are, to a
large extent, the same factors that might give rise to juror concerns about
intimidation or retaliation." Even a defendant who has no intention of
interfering with the jury does not have a right to rely on a fearsome,
intimidating reputation to discourage conviction.' 4'
In the past, the government has been able to prosecute powerful and
notorious criminals without concealing jurors' identities. 42 The prose-
cutor in Barnes did not even ask for the procedure but, rather, benefited
from a sua sponte judicial order. '13 The current need for anonymous
132. Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 36.
133. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Indict-
ment at 3, United States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984).
135. See United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 124 (1985).
136. See id. at 854; United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362 (2d Cir.) (also refer-
ring to the activities of the Barnes defendants), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); United
States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 850, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Indictment at 8-19, United
States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984).
137. See United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
138. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 66 (1985); Indictment at 20-21, United States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984).
139. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
140. See eg., Indictment at 3, 8-19, United States v. Catellano, No. 84 Cr. 63
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984) (defendants allegedly commited numerous murders to elimi-
nate actual and potential witnesses, competitors and obstacles); cf. United States %.
Thomas, 632 F.2d 837, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1980) (after hearing evidence that one of the
defendants threatened a witness, jurors asked court officer whether they had anything to
fear from defendants).
141. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir.) (even without specific
threat, generalized fear of retaliation justified anonymity), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66
(1985).
142. See, eg., Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943) (murder prosecution of
well-known depression era gangster); Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.) (tax
evasion prosecution of famed Chicago racketeer), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932).
143. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill. J., dissent-
ing), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
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juries, however, arises almost exclusively from the increasing number of
RICO cases characterized by unusual size, scope, publicity and severity
of charges. 1" Moreover, bolstered by sophisticated electronic surveil-
lence 4 5 and the increased willingness of insiders to testify due to the
federal Witness Protection Program,146 prosecutors are finding it easier
to prove the dramatic charges characterizing the current cases.' 4 7 The
scope and strength of the charges in these cases, combined with indica-
tions of the defendants' past willingness and ability to obstruct justice, 148
fully justify the use of anonymous juries.
Although Barnes was not a RICO prosecution, 149 comparing Barnes to
United States v. Bufalino,150 a case often cited as an example of the gov-
ernment's ability to obtain major convictions without juror anonym-
ity, 5' illuminates the justification for anonymity in current trials.
Barnes received a life sentence for various narcotics and conspiracy
charges and his codefendants received sentences ranging from eight to
thirty years. 152 The allegations of violent conduct, both within and with-
out the indictment, were extraordinary. 53 The defendants in Bufalino,
including Paul Castellano, reputed leader of the Gambino crime family,
were initially convicted and sentenced to three to five year prison terms
for conspiracy to commit perjury and obstruct justice. 5 4 The case arose
out of the government's frustrated attempt to discover the nature of a
highly publicized meeting of men alleged to be the leaders of various
organized crime factions.'5 5 The Second Circuit reversed the convictions
for insufficiency of evidence and remanded with instructions to dismiss
the conspiracy counts.'5 6
144. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
145. See Brill, supra note 3, at 28-29.
146. Id. at 29.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Indictment at 3, United States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 1984).
In United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907
(1980), the court noted that there was a history of jury tampering in narcotics cases
prosecuted in the Southern District of New York. See id. at 134 n.3. According to the
testimony of a former attorney affiliated with organized crime, organized crime defend-
ants routinely attempt to bribe or intimidate jurors. See Deposition of a Witness Before
the President's Commission on Organized Crime at 159-70 (available in the files of the
Fordham Law Review).
149. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
150. 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 175 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); Abramovsky, supra note 6, at 37 & n.40.
152. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
153. See id. at 141; see also United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362 (2d Cir.)
(members of the Barnes conspiracy routinely approved murder of witnesses), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
154. See United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1960).
155. See id. at 411-15.
156. See id. at 418-19.
[Vol. 541000
ANONYMOUS JURIES
If anything, Bufalino epitomizes the government's past inability to ob-
tain significant indictments and convictions against major organized
crime figures.157 Had Castellano lived, he would have spent significantly
more time in federal court merely defending the charges against him in a
series of wide-ranging racketeering cases than he probably would have
spent in prison on the Bufalino conviction.' If convicted in any one of
the current trials, he probably would have spent the rest of his life in
prison.15 9 Thus, the stakes are so high that the risks of jury interference
are trivial. Moreover, RICO forfeiture provisions strike at the sources of
income of the entire criminal organization, thereby giving unindicted
members of the enterprise greater incentive to interfere with the jury."6°
Although the need for anonymity is not limited to traditional organized
crime cases,' 61 and the factors considered in empaneling anonymous ju-
ries existed to a lesser degree in cases preceding Barnes,62 the procedure
is an appropriate safety measure in cases that "stretch the traditional
dimensions of criminal law."' 163
IV. STANDARD FOR USING AN ANONYMOUS JURY
To guard against unnecessary use of anonymous juries, the circuits
should establish specific guidelines governing the imposition of anonym-
ity. This Note recommends a test recently articulated by Judge John F.
Keenan of the Southern District of New York.
First, the trial judge should consider whether defendants have partici-
pated in "'dangerous and unscrupulous conduct' . . . with particular
consideration of whether such conduct was part of a 'large-scale organ-
ized' criminal enterprise."' 165 While the seriousness of the charges is im-
portant because it creates incentive to interfere with the jury,166 the
criminal enterprise aspect deserves emphasis because it suggests an abil-
ity to reach the jury regardless of the situation of individual defendants,
who may be in custody. 167 An ongoing criminal enterprise is also likely
157. See Raab, Getting the Drop on the Mob, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1984, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 6, col. 3 (until recently, organized crime families were largely invulnerable).
158. See Stille, supra note 3, at 6 (series of Castellano trials may take close to a year).
Castellano was also facing trial in the "commission" case. See Indictment at 1, United
States v. Salerno, No. 85 Cr. 139 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 26, 1985).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
160. See supra note 4.
161. See United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1984) (contempt prose-
cution of suspected members of terrorist group).
162. See supra note 142.
163. Stille, supra note 3, at 6.
164. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
165. Id.
166. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362 (2d Cir.) (seriousness of
charges and widespread publicity left defendants little to lose by obstructing the trial),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
167. According to the New York City Police Department, the Gambino crime family
has approximately 800 members and associates. See Fowler, 5 Organized.Crime Factions
Operating in New York Area, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at B5, col. 1.
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to intimidate the jury, especially in the current trials involving the tradi-
tional organized crime families. 6 ' It is certainly no coincidence that a
common thread running through all anonymous jury trials to date is the
allegation of an ongoing criminal enterprise. 6
9
The second relevant factor is evidence of defendants' "past attempts to
interfere with the judicial process."' 70 As discussed previously, the judge
need not consider only actual attempts at jury tampering but should con-
sider all attempts to evade prosecution, especially those involving
violence. '7'
Finally, pretrial publicity militates in favor of anonymity because it
enhances "the possibility that jurors' names would become public and
.. . expose them to intimidation by defendants' friends or enemies, or
harassment by the public."'7 2 While heavy publicity characterizes many
criminal trials,"' 3 the extraordinary length of many current cases 174 in-
creases the possibility that the jurors themselves will become "celebri-
ties" with dangerous exposure to outside influence and intimidation.
17
Absent evidence of jury tampering, a judge must weigh these factors
carefully to avoid unnecessary erosion of the presumption of inno-
cence. 176 In the rare case in which a defendant makes an unequivocal
threat to the jury,17 7 however, lack of publicity or any other considera-
tions should not preclude anonymity. The government's case might in-
168. The widespread public fear of organized crime and of the Mafia in particular is
central to its success. See, e.g., United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (Colombo group's criminal activities were aided by the public's fear of the organi-
zation); Indictment at 6, United States v. Rastelli, No. 85 Cr. 00354 (E.D.N.Y. filed June
13, 1985) (defendants maintained their control of the moving and storage industry by
identifying themselves with organized crime).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1362 (2d Cir.) (defendants
were members of huge narcotics ring operating in New York City throughout the 1970's),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 846-47 (2d
Cir.) (defendants were members of politically motivated criminal organization responsi-
ble for a series of bank robberies, two murders and the escape of one member from
prison), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 124 (1985); United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 94 (2d
Cir. 1984) (defendants were suspected members of terrorist group responsible for periodic
bombings throughout the United States); United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendants are allegedly the key members of large, multi-faceted crimi-
nal enterprise); Indictment at 2-4, United States v. Castellano, No. 84 Cr. 63 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Oct. 4, 1984) (same).
170. United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
171. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
173. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
174. See United States v. Louie, 625 F. Supp. 1327, 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
175. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353-55 (1966).
176. See United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 877-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.) (evidence of
defendant's intent to retaliate against witnesses, grand jurors and prosecutors and, implic-
itly, any person involved in the prosecution of the group), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 124
(1985).
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clude evidence of the threat,' which would certainly intimidate the jury
and destroy any hope of objective judgment if their identities were known
to the defendants. Moreover, any defendant reckless enough to declare
publicly or demonstrate a threat to the jury might be inclined to act on
that threat even after a conviction.' 79 Finally, explicitly threatening a
juror should constitute a constructive waiver of any privilege the defend-
ant may usually have to know the identities of the jurors.'8 0
CONCLUSION
Fear, undue influence and prejudice should not be permitted to affect
the outcome of a criminal trial. An impartial jury is not only a criminal
defendant's constitutional right but a hallmark of any civilized judicial
system. In extraordinary cases, juror anonymity is necessary to ensure
this goal. Rather than alerting a juror to a defendant's violent persona,
anonymity merely allays existing fears and prevents outside forces from
prejudicing either side. That a juror who is free from fear and intimida-
tion is more likely to convict speaks more to the strength of the govern-
ment's case than to any inherent unfairness in the anonymity procedure.
Preventing a defendant from using his reputation or resources to discour-
age conviction preserves, rather than subverts, the integrity of the judi-
cial process.
Eric Wertheim
178. Whether the evidence of defendants' threats to grand jurors, witnesses and prose-
cutors in Ferguson was introduced at trial is not clear. See id. at 854.
179. Cf. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir. 1985) (evidence of
defendant's intent to retaliate against witnesses, grand jurors and prosecutors and, implic-
itly, any person involved in the prosecution of the group). Since a post-indictment threat
to grand jurors would do nothing to undermine or delay the trial, one can only infer that
the group would be willing to act on the threat for revenge or as a political statement.
180. Cf Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (constitutional right to confront
witnesses can be lost by misconduct).
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